Review of “The Courts and Social Policy,” by Donald L. Horowitz by Howard, J. Woodford, Jr.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 1978 
Issue 4 A Tribute to Arno Cumming Becht 
January 1978 
Review of “The Courts and Social Policy,” by Donald L. Horowitz 
J. Woodford Howard Jr. 
The Johns Hopkins University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Courts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
J. Woodford Howard Jr., Review of “The Courts and Social Policy,” by Donald L. Horowitz, 1978 WASH. U. L. 
Q. 833 (1978). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1978/iss4/16 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
BOOK REVIEWS
THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY
By Donald L. Horowitz*
Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1977. Pp. 309. $11.95.
The appropriate limits of judicial policymaking have long vexed the
American Republic. Expanding judicial activism since the 1960's has
revived debate over classic issues of the role of judges in our govern-
mental scheme. How can judicial lawmaking be reconciled with popu-
lar democracy? How can courts sponsor social change without
personalizing the law and transforming judicial functions in the separa-
tion of powers?
Donald L. Horowitz' study, The Courts and Social Policy, is likely to
become a landmark in this literature because it shifts the focus from the
legitimacy of judicial review in democratic theory to the capacity of
courts to make and implement social policy effectively. Ignoring the
familiar question of whether judges should innovate, the author exam-
ines their ability to do so from both functional and empirical perspec-
tives. This approach--does it work?-has the merit of eschewing the
wooden intentionalism and literalism of Raoul Berger and other critics
of "the imperial judiciary."' It also comes to grips with the changing
shape of judicial activism in a period when courts compel as well as
constrain social action and do so in administrative as well as legislative
environments. The result is a concentrated critique of judicial poli-
cymaking in vacuums of public power.
Horowitz' central thesis is that the very processes of adjudication that
equip courts to resolve particular legal disputes ill-suit them for resolv-
ing general social problems. This argument is hardly new. Illuminat-
ing is how he defends it. In the first two chapters, after accounting for
the scope and sources of expanded judicial responsibilities, he inven-
* Senior Fellow, Research Institute on Immigration and Ethnic Studies, Smithsonian Insti-
tution. A.B., 1959, LL.B., 1961, Syracuse University; LL.M., 1963, M.A., 1965, Ph.D., 1967,
Harvard University.
1. See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977); Glazer, Towards An Imperial
Judiciary, 41 PUB. INTEREST 104 (1975).
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tories the attributes that distinguish adjudication from other forms of
decision. This inventory, heavily influenced by Lon L. Fuller2 and
others3 concerned with the "fit" between governmental process and
policy problems, is itself a valuable contribution. It summarizes suc-
cinctly a process-oriented or functional view of judicial restraint, which
has flourished in law school circles in the last generation. Though
Horowitz does not define adjudication, he identifies five distinctive at-
tributes, all traceable to discrete problem-solving by adversary process,
which limit the capacity of courts as effective policymakers. Adjudica-
tion, he asserts, (1) focuses on rights and remedies, (2) is piecemeal, (3)
lacks the initiative but must respond when litigants call, (4) is ill-
adapted to ascertaining "behavioral facts" relevant to broad social
problems, and (5) makes no provision for continuous policy review. 4
Most is made of the latter two conditions. Horowitz argues that courts
have not faced up to the social costs or unanticipated consequences of
their decisions. "The very notion of planning is alien to adjudication." 5
The author illustrates these general themes with four case studies,
one per chapter, covering a broad range of policy innovations by fed-
eral courts. In order to amplify the context of each, the author reserves
to the last chapter linking the cases to the attributes of adjudication.
Yet, several important questions are considered throughout, including
how courts frame issues, use and misuse social science evidence, devise
legal solutions, and affect target constituencies. The case histories are
not simply impact studies of judicial decisions; they are detailed
pathologies in judicial policymaking. Each shows judicial policies gone
awry because of constraints inherent in the process of adjudication.
The worst failure was the Third Circuit's decision in the Area- Wide
Council case,6 where the court interpreted the "citizen participation"
requirement of the Model Cities program. For Horowitz the case high-
lights the limited ability of courts, accustomed to reviewing action com-
2. See, e.g., Fuller, The Forns and Limits of Adjudication, in THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRU-
DENCE (temp. ed. 1949, 1961).
3. H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW (tent. ed. 1958); K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DEC1D-
ING APPEALS (1960).
4. D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL. POLICY 33-56 (1977).
5. Id at 51.
6. North City Area-Wide Council, Inc. v. Romney, No. 69-1909 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 12, 1969),
rep'd, 428 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1970), on remand, 329 F. Supp. 1124 (E.D. Pa.), rev'd, 456 F.2d 811
(3d Cir. 1971), cer. denied, 406 U.S. 963 (1972), on remand, No. 69-1909 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 1972),




pleted elsewhere, to control action in progress. Restricted to
intermittent intervention at the initiative of others, judges were unable
to control the balance of competing political forces outside the court-
room. Street demonstrations rather than adjudication ultimately set-
tled the issue of the scope of citizen participation.
In Hobson v. Hansen,7 the problem was fashioning appropriate reme-
dies for racial discrimination in the public schools in the District of
Columbia. The court progressively narrowed the legal remedy from
equalization of all educational resources to equalization of per pupil
expenditures for teacher salaries. The premise, not validated by social
science evidence, was that a positive relationship existed between
teacher expenditures and student performance.' Narrower still was the
outcome.9 School officials managed to comply by merely transferring
special-subject teachers-a maneuver requiring central controls that
collided with competing policy goals of decentralized management of
public schools.' 0 The main lessons of this episode, to Horowitz, are the
limits of adjudication in developing reliable "behavioral facts" for
framing policy alternatives and the risks of unanticipated consequences
as judicial objectives are implemented in unfamiliar terrain.
Similar deficiencies marred In re Gault" and Mapp v. Ohio, 2 two
major cases of criminal procedure where judges presumably had more
knowledge and control over events. In both instances, however,
Horowitz contends that results fell short of intended goals and gener-
ated unexpected reactions. The chief culprit in both cases was the ten-
dency of the Justices to apply a formal model of adversary trial to
govern decisions below that were inherently informal and diverse in
character. The Supreme Court overestimated the potential of formal
rules to alter informal practices pervading the criminal justice system in
highly diverse conditions across the country.
In particular, Horowitz criticizes the Court in Gault for being insuffi-
ciently skeptical of both social scientists and lawyers.' 3 The initial
premise that excessive informality of decisionmaking obstructs rehabil-
itation of juvenile delinquents was empirically suspect. The remedies
7. 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), affdsub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir.
1%9) (en bane),further relief ordered, 327 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1971).
8. Id. at 436-38.
9. Smuck v. Hobson, 327 F. Supp. 844, 863-64 (D.D.C. 1971).
10. Id
11. 387 U.s. 1 (1967).
12. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
13. D. HOROWIrZ, supra note 4, at 172-77.
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of counsel and formal hearings were faulty because lawyers neither ap-
peared with the expected frequency nor accepted the adversary ethos
when they did. On the other hand, Gault encouraged other changes:
decriminalization of substantive law, diversion of noncriminal cases
from juvenile courts, and homogenization of juvenile and adult crimi-
nal procedures. Because the standards regressed toward those of plea
bargaining, not adversary trial, Gault backfired. Even for problems
close to home, Horowitz concludes that courts find it difficult to isolate
causes and effects and to prevent subordinates from developing infor-
mal surrogates for onerous formal procedures imposed from above.' 4
What was true of Gault characterized Mapp "many times over."' '15
Recognizing that the exclusionary rule has dual objectives-deterrence
of police misconduct and preserving the integrity of adjudica-
tion-Horowitz believes that the empirical foundations for both posi-
tions are empirically shaky. Compliance with Mapp has been "a
sometime, some-crime, someplace thing."' 6 The primary effect was not
to exclude evidence from trial, the presumed Supreme Court objective,
but to alter the structure of incentives in pretrial bargaining about guilt
and sentences. Affecting conduct in the corridors more than in court-
rooms, "Mapp exemplifies the judicial propensity to see things whole
and homogeneous, when in fact they are fragmented and
heterogeneous."' 7
Though the purpose of these case studies is to develop a first set of
generalizations about judicial capacity to shape social policy, Horowitz'
conclusions emphasize judicial impotence. No problem turned out to
be what the judges perceived, and no decision achieved the intended
results. Adjudication, he concludes, is a poor format to plan, weigh
alternatives, calculate costs, monitor compliance, and manage social
programs. The very distinctiveness of the judicial process-"its expen-
diture of social resources on individual complaints, one at a time-is
what unfits the courts for much of the important work of govern-
ment."' Horowitz also emphasizes that judges as policymakers are en-
feebled by an inherent bias toward formality and uniformity. Courts
need to be "more cautious about dealing with diversity by means of
14. Id at 217-19.
15. Id at 238.
16. Id at 224.
17. Id at 254.





This summary hardly does justice to the sophistication of Horowitz'
analysis regarding the relation of the judicial process to policy prod-
ucts. His attempts to generalize, however, expose several flaws and
limits in his argument. In the first place, Horowitz is an advocate. The
case histories do not represent the whole. Excluded are decisions in
state courts, cases for which adjudication is presumptively well-suited,
and examples of judicial pioneering that succeeded. The abortion deci-
sions come to mind as having quick impact in reducing deaths during
pregnancy.2" The high court also recalibrated policies in a continuing
stream of litigation. The reapportionment decisions are instances of
high compliance but low policy impact.2! The effort to demark the lim-
its of judicial capacity would have been more convincing had the selec-
tion of cases been less one-sided.
Second, the author ignores effects of judicial policy innovations on
the workloads of courts. It is a good question whether lower courts can
deliver en masse the procedural improvements intended by the
Supreme Court without greatly expanded judicial resources or resort to
mass production. Either alternative will transform the traditional proc-
ess of adjudication. Horowitz' case might have been stronger had he
considered the administrative dimension of court-directed reform.
Third, the case studies are unsystematic. The lack of a common ana-
lytical framework limits their utility. The generalizations in the last
chapter, moreover, are not woven in terms of the attributes of adjudica-
tion outlined earlier. A certain disjunction thus imbues the general and
particular sections of Horowitz' own work.
Fourth, and most important, the analysis is not comparative. The
question of "relative institutional capacity" concededly stalks the argu-
ment.22 The thesis is that the attributes of adjudication are distinc-
tive-and debilitating for courts as effective policymakers. The
implication is that other institutions and processes of decision could do
better, while judges should stick to their distinctive knitting. "The dan-
ger is that courts, in developing a capacity to improve on the work of
19. Id at 283.
20. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See Wall St. J., Feb. 1, 1977, at 15, col. 1.
21. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). See S.
WASBY, THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 116-26 (1970).
22. D. HOROWITZ, supra note 4, at 294.
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other institutions, may become altogether too much like them. 2 3
Perhaps so, but the thesis cannot be proven without comparison or
on this evidence. In fact, the case studies may prove the opposite of
what Horowitz contends. The literature on decisionmaking in other
organizations is replete with the same problems of defining issues and
marshaling evidence, of planning and supervising subordinates, of
spinning unanticipated consequences and informal surrogates for for-
mal procedures that Horowitz attributes to the unique misfit between
the process of adjudication and general social problems. Herbert A.
Simon recently won a Nobel Prize for work showing that similar gaps
between goals and performance are endemic to decisionmaking in or-
ganizations.24 In an imperfect world, why should courts differ?
The basic problem is that Horowitz, presuming a rational model of
adjudication without proof, does not clearly differentiate judging from
other processes of governmental decision. He does not subject poli-
cymaking in legislatures and bureaucracies-even decisions in particu-
lar controversies that arguably "fit" adjudication-to the same strict
scrutiny. The typology of problems suitable or unsuitable for judicial
resolution is not well-developed. Blurred in consequence are the ways
in which policymaking in all branches of government is uniform and in
what ways adjudication is unique. The author concedes these are ques-
tions of degree. Yet, he presumes that judging involves a single process
rather than multiple processes of decision in shifting policy networks.
Clearer about what courts cannot do than what they can do, he under-
estimates a particular advantage of adjudication in policy development,
ite., incrementalism, proceeding by trial and error, case-by-case, when
the principles at stake are inchoate or dimly perceived.25 Neglected,
too, is a larger question of whether some policy problems are beyond
all government solution.
No one, of course, can consider everything at once. The causal
proofs required to confirm Horowitz' thesis may well exceed the capac-
ity of social science. Besides, he attempts only initial approximations.
If the book may be criticized for advocacy and lack of comparative
analysis, it is nonetheless a significant contribution to the literature of
judicial decisionmaking and of public policy generally. Focusing on ju-
23. Id at 298.
24. H. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES IN
ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION (2d ed. 1961).
25. See Shapiro, Stability and Change in Judicial Decisionmaking: Incrementallsm or Stare
Decisis?, 2 L. TRANSITION Q. 134 (1965).
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dicial capacity as an empirical question subjects to critical examination
the assumptions and proofs that too often are taken for granted in nor-
mative debates over the proper boundaries of judicial power. To grap-
ple with limits inherent in adjudication as a process places the theory of
judicial decision in a larger search for manageable problems in Ameri-
can government. The book is succinct, well-written, and provocative.
Discriminating allocation of public authority according to the "fit" be-
tween policy problems and processes of decision is its theme. It should
be required reading for anyone interested in public policy and the role
of courts in governing the United States.
J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR.**
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